1 Governments increasingly use their purchasing power to promote environmental policy objectives. For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed environmentally preferable purchasing guidelines for goods ranging from paint, paper and cleaning supplies to lumber and electricity, and many state and local governments have taken similar steps.
1 The European Union's green public procurement policy is predicated on the rationale of stimulating market supply, noting that "a significant demand from public authorities for 'greener' goods will create or enlarge markets for environmentally friendly products and services… [and] stimulate the use of green standards in private procurement." 2 Since government purchases account for 10-15 percent of GDP in developed countries, green procurement policies could have a substantial impact on the environment. However, many of these policies have a broader goal of encouraging private adoption of similar environmental standards and policies. In principle, governments' green procurement policies could lead to private adoption of similar standards, stimulate supplier markets for more environmentally benign products and generally encourage firms and individuals to prioritize environmental concerns in their procurement decisions. But do public procurement policies have these intended impacts, and if so why? To our knowledge, our study is the first to examine this question.
We examine the diffusion of the US Green Building Council's LEED standard for sustainable building practices. Specifically, we ask whether private-sector developers and real-estate professionals are more likely to seek LEED certification in cities with a municipal green building policy that applies only to new public buildings (i.e., a green procurement policy). We find that LEED adoption by real-estate developers is 80 percent greater in municipalities with a public green-building policy than in a matched control sample of cities of similar size and demographic characteristics (including measures of "green preference" such as voting on environmental ballot initiatives and Toyota Prius ownership rates). Further analysis reveals that the impact of these municipal procurement policies on private sector procurement does not stop at the city line. Specifically, we find more LEED adoption among "neighbor cities" that border a city that adopts a green building policy, compared to these neighboring cities' own set of matched controls. The large magnitude of these neighbor-city effects suggest that private LEED adoption is not purely an effort to pre-empt local regulations, a motive described in Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) , or seek favors in the in zoning and permitting process.
To explain the link between public green procurement policies and the diffusion of the LEED standard among private developers, we consider two possible mechanisms. First, government procurement may provide a boost in demand for the services of LEED accredited real-estate professionals (APs) -architects, contractors and other professionals who have passed an exam certifying their knowledge of LEED building principlescausing more professionals to seek that credential and reducing the marginal cost of LEED adoption for private developers. Alternatively, the market for green buildings may exhibit excess inertia (Farrell and Saloner 1986) , where developers' willingness to adopt LEED depends on the availability of local real-estate professionals who are familiar with the standard, and local professionals' willingness to make LEED-specific investments is contingent on demand from developers. For cities stuck (perhaps temporarily) in a low-LEED equilibrium, government procurement policies may jump-start the development of specialized input markets by providing a guaranteed demand for LEED accredited realprofessionals, thereby reducing the risk of investing in standard-specific human capital.
We find two pieces of evidence consistent with the coordination failure or excess inertia theory of spillovers from public to private LEED procurement. First, while real estate professionals could presumably cover the fixed costs of accreditation purely from private demand in larger cities, we find that the estimated impact of a public green procurement policy is increasing in city-size (measured as population or total non-residential construction activity). And second, we use green policy adoption in distant cities as an instrument for the number of LEED APs in nearby cities to estimate the causal impact of LEED APs on private developers' LEED adoption rates. The results suggest that the supply of LEED APs is a salient factor in private decisions to pursue LEED certification.
Our study is among the first to examine how the private sector responds to public green procurement policies. Corts (2010) shows that government procurement of "flex fuel"
vehicles increases the supply of ethanol at local filling stations. We extend his results by asking whether the increased supply of complementary goods reflects coordination or capacity building, and by measuring the "same side" spillovers in private adoption of the government procured good (i.e. an increase in private LEED building that is analogous to increased private purchasing of "flex fuel" vehicles).
Overall, our findings suggest that government purchasing policies can stimulate private adoption of green building practices. While this could occur through a wide variety of mechanisms -such as increasing local awareness of the benefits of green building (i.e., moral suasion) or encouraging the adoption of a particular measurement system -we emphasize the idea that governments may break deadlocks that emerge when coordinated investments are required to adopt a common standard. That is, governments may take the role of "lead adopter."
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: Section I outlines a simple framework for analyzing the impact of green building procurement policies, and describes the USGBC Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard. Section II describes our data, measures, and empirical methods. Section III describes the empirical results, and Section IV offers concluding remarks.
I. Background

A. Government Green Procurement Policies
Government purchasing guidelines often use price preferences or quantity targets (typically called set-asides) to reward products that meet environmental criteria such as incorporating recycled content, exhibiting pollution levels well below regulatory limits, or exceeding voluntary energy efficiency standards. When the government is a major customer, these policies can have a significant direct environmental impact due to the government's own procurement decisions. Governments can also use green procurement policies to signal concern for the environment when regulatory intervention is costly or infeasible.
When the government is not a major customer, the impact of government greenprocurement policies will depend on how government purchasing interacts with private sector procurement decisions. 3 In practice, governments recognize this, and design policies that they hope will "influence the behavior of other socio-economic actors by setting the example, and by sending clear signals to the market-place" (OECD, 2000, p. 20 In principle, the choice of government procurement rules can influence private purchasing behavior through either supply or demand channels. Moreover, the private response to government procurement rules might either reinforce or counteract the direct impacts of a government green purchasing policy. Figure 1 provides a simple framework, based on Marron (2003) , for categorizing these potential impacts.
On the supply side, procurement policies can lead to greener private purchasing when there are significant scale economies in key input markets, so an initial government purchase reduces the average cost of serving the marginal private customer. Government purchasing preferences may also help suppliers overcome "chicken and egg" coordination problems by pushing the market towards a particular standard. For example, we show how municipal green-building policies led architects and builders to pursue LEED credentials, which presumably stimulates demand in other complementary markets (e.g., for energyand water efficient products). This "coordination failure" story is based on the central twosided markets assumption that private customers and input suppliers cannot somehow internalize the benefits of making a coordinated investment in the same platform, perhaps because of the risk that standard-specific investment will be stranded or under-utilized.
Finally, government procurement rules may lead to increased competition and innovation on favored product attributes. For example, Siemens (2003) suggests that a preference for the Energy Star label in government computer purchasing led to increased innovation in energy efficient electronics.
There is no guarantee, however, green procurement policies will have a positive impact on private adoption. For instance, government procurement programs favoring environmental products may "crowd out" private purchases of these same products if supply is inelastic and consumers are willing to substitute to "browner" alternatives due to the price pressure caused by the government procurement program. Thus, the potential benefits associated with green procurement programs can be eroded or even eliminated in some settings.
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On the demand side, private purchasing can reinforce green procurement rules when the government policy increases the visibility or credibility of a green product (or label), or if the policy sets a moral example that private purchasers choose to follow. We expect these "informational" demand-side effects to be most salient when the green product or label has minimal market share (so demonstration effects are particularly important) and when private customers already have other incentives to adopt greener products (e.g., because of energy-cost savings).
On the demand side, public procurement may crowd-out private demand if consumers come to perceive that the public sector is already "doing enough" to support the underlying policy goals (e.g. through minority set-asides or green procurement). Finally, when procurement rules define a sharp cutoff between "green" and "brown" products, and In practice, the importance of each of supply and demand-side channels described above will depend on specific features of the relevant product market. increasing total point thresholds qualify projects for increasingly prestigious certification levels: Certified, Silver, Gold, and Platinum.
The costs of LEED certification will vary by type of project and certification level, and are primarily related to coordinating the required design elements and using more expensive materials and technologies. We could find no systematic data on these construction-related costs, which vary between buildings. Activities required to achieve some LEED points seem relatively cheap (e.g., installing bike racks), while others are quite expensive (e.g., remediating a brown-field site). The administrative costs of LEED certification are small by comparison, amounting to roughly $450-600 to register a project with USGBC and an additional $2,000 certification fee. Some developers also choose to hire a consultant to provide guidance on the LEED-eligibility of particular design choices and procurement decisions, and to prepare the LEED application.
For a commercial building, the benefits of LEED can accrue from reduced operating costs and/or increased rents and occupancy rates. Engineering estimates from a study of 121
LEED certified projects that volunteered data on energy use suggest these buildings consume 25-30 percent less energy than the national average for comparable projects (Turner and Frankel 2008) . However, LEED certification emphasizes design elements rather than energy consumption, and several observers have suggested that more work is needed to understand whether LEED certified buildings actually deliver long-term environmental benefits. As for revenues, Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley (2009) find that LEED certified buildings charge 3% higher rents (with an additional 2.5% for Silver) and have higher sale prices and occupancy rates.
The LEED certification process begins with the developer registering a project with USGBC, which "serves as a declaration of intent to certify" the building, provides access to LEED information and tools, and lists the projects in the publicly-available online LEED project database. 9 Once the construction or renovations have been completed, the certification application is submitted, reviewed, and approved, the applicant is sent a plaque (often displayed in the lobby in commercial buildings) and the project becomes eligible for inclusion in the online LEED database of certified projects.
While the LEED system debuted in 1998, it did not achieve significant scale until the second half of the 2000's. Figure 
II. Data
To assess the impact of municipal green-building procurement policies on private LEED adoption, we collected data on 735 California cities from 2001 to 2008. We selected California because it has the largest economy of any US state, and the greatest number of cities that have adopted a green-building policy. Our dataset combines information from a variety of sources. We obtained measures of LEED diffusion from the USGBC, data on non-residential construction starts from McGraw Hill, city-level demographic data from the US Census, and we hand-collected data on the municipal adoption of green-building policies. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 .
Our main explanatory variable indicates whether a focal city (or a neighboring city that shares a common border) had adopted a municipal green building policy in the current calendar year. We gathered information on the adoption of municipal green-building policies by hand, starting from lists compiled by the USGBC and the U.S. Department of Energy-funded Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE).
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Our broad search identified 155 US cities that had adopted some type of green building ordinance by 2008. Forty of these municipalities were located in California, though we exclude from our analysis six cities whose regulations impose green building mandates on private-sector development.
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Municipal green-building policies vary in a number of dimensions, including the types of structures affected (by size, owner, and use); whether they cover new buildings or also renovations; and how they measure environmental performance. We gathered as much detail on individual policies as we could through city web sites and the online library of municipal codes. 12 Our research suggests that 87 percent of all green-building polices contained a purchasing rule: a requirement that new public projects adhere to some type of environmental standard, and ninety percent of these specified the LEED standard.
We code an indicator variable Green Policy to equal "1" if a city adopted a green procurement policy by 2008, and "0" otherwise. We code Green Neighbor to equal "1" for cities that do not adopt a green procurement policy but have an adjacent city (i.e., a city with a common border) that does adopt a green procurement policy, and "0" otherwise. it is only the first step towards certification. The USGBC encourages projects to register early, since many decisions that will influence certification levels must be taken at early stages of the overall development process. Because the lag from registration to certification may be several years, and the LEED standard was diffusing rapidly toward the end of our sample period, a count of certified buildings would exclude a large number of projects in our data set.
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As a second outcome variable, we create a count of Government Registrations, in order to verify that municipal government green procurement policies actually lead to an increase in government LEED procurement. This variable is a count of new non-residential structures owned by a local government that registered for LEED certification between 2001 and 2008. The cities in our sample registered between zero and twelve new 13 We exclude the four largest cities in California when calculating these summary statistics, since they could not be matched (and are therefore excluded from the analysis below) and tend to distort the sample averages due to their extreme size. 14 For the buildings where we have certification data, the average lag between registration and certification is between 2 and 3 years. Anecdotal evidence suggest that few registered buildings fail to certify at some level. 15 A second drawback of relying on LEED Registrations or LEED certifications is that they do not contain any information on the environmental impact of certification, a topic we leave to future research. Population (measured in units of 10,000), Income (median household income in $10,000's), and College (the share of adults with some college education).
Environmental Preferences:
In addition to these standard demographic variables, we collected several novel measures of a city's preference for environmental sustainability.
First, we calculated Green Ballot Share as the share of citizens' own votes in favor of 16 Matching political jurisdictions to census data was done at the level of the Census Place.
in Table 1 
B. Matching and Covariate Balance
In the first part of our empirical analysis, we use the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) approach described by Iacus, King and Porro (2009) to examine the reduced-form impact of green procurement policies on LEED Registrations and Accreditations. This approach assumes that after stratifying and re-weighting the data to account for the distribution of observed exogenous variables, the endogenous treatment variables (i.e., Green Policy or Green Neighbor) are as good as randomly assigned. Intuitively, CEM is just a method of pre-processing a dataset before running a weighted least-squares regression. One begins by "coarsening" (discretizing) the variables in order to construct a multi-dimensional histogram. The next step is to discard observations from any cell that does not contain both treated and control observations. Finally, the units are weighted such that a weight of "1" is assigned to each treated unit, and T i /C i to each control observation in cell i (where T i and C i are the number of treatment and control observations in the i th stratum of the multi-dimensional histogram respectively).
and easier to implement than propensity score balancing. Table 2 compares all cities that adopt a green-building policy (excluding the four largest) to the full set of potential controls (i.e., all other cities in California) using unweighted OLS regressions. 19 Not surprisingly, we find that cities adopting a green-building policy are larger, greener, wealthier, and better educated than the potential controls. There is a statistically significant difference in the means of each variable except for a per-capita measure of new construction activity.
The middle panel in Table 2 compares CEM weighted means for the matched sample of
Green Policy adopters and their controls. Note that matching on Population and
Prius2008 excludes four cities from the treatment group, dropping its size to just 25 municipalities. Since we already dropped the four largest cities from our treatment group, these newly excluded cities were primarily municipalities with very high levels of Prius ownership (e.g., Berkeley and Santa Monica), as can be seen by the 0.15 percentage point drop in Prius2008 among the adopters. Since we used the distribution of Population and
Prius2008 to construct the match, we should observe no difference in the means of these variables across treatment and control cities. However, Table 2 shows that matching on these two dimensions removes differences in the means of all observables across the two sub-samples.
The rightmost panel in Table 2 compares means for neighboring cities and their matched controls. The treated cities in this comparison are smaller and slightly less green than their neighbors who adopt a green building policy. Once again, the matching and reweighting removes observable differences in the means of most covariates. We do observe a statistically significant difference in the means of LCV Senate. However, it is not surprising that we should reject the null hypothesis of no difference in one of our 18 tests, and we find no difference in the means of LCV House or Green Ballot Share, our other political proxies for environmental preference.
C. LEED Diffusion
While the majority of our control variables are cross-sectional, it is possible to create panel data using the dates for policy adoption and the LEED outcome variables. All four of the graphs in Figure 3 illustrate the same rapid acceleration in LEED diffusion that we observed in Figure 2 . And in all four cases, the effect is more pronounced for Green Policy adopters (or Green Neighbors) than for the matched control sample. (These patterns are even more striking if we do not use the CEM weights, since there are relatively more small cities in the matched control samples, and he weighting procedure makes these small markets less important). We also observe a small "bump" in 
III. Results
A. Cross-sectional Models
We begin our empirical analysis with a cross-sectional comparison of cumulative LEED adoption in the treatment and control cities. Our matching approach creates a matched group with treatment and control cities that are balanced with respect to all of the observable covariates we associate with policy adoption. Under the assumption that assignment to the treatment group is independent of potential outcomes conditional on observables, a simple t-test is sufficient to estimate the causal impact of the green building procurement policy. Since adding controls is more familiar, and may lead to increased precision, we use OLS regression instead of a t-test. 20 Specifically, we estimate the following linear regression:
(1) We estimate this model using weighted OLS regression. As stressed in Angrist and Pishke (2008) , OLS provides the best linear approximation to the conditional expectation function, regardless of the fact that Y i is a count variable. 21 The results are presented in find that the effect grows significantly larger if we do not perform the CEM matching and weighting.
The second column of Table 3 shows that there are an average of 1.6 more Government LEED Registrations in cities adopting a green-building procurement policy. This is not surprising, since "green building" is the stated policy goal, and 90 percent of these policies use LEED as the relevant yardstick. Nevertheless, it is reassuring to see a large and statistically significant impact.
The third column in Table 3 shows that there is an increase of 13.09 LEED Accreditations in Green Policy adopting cities, relative to the matched controls. This corresponds to an increase of roughly 33 percent beyond the mean of 39.74, but is not statistically significant. Once again, the result is highly robust to specification, and grows large (and statistically significant) if we include the largest policy-adopting cities that do not have a CEM match. One reason why the LEED Accreditation result is weaker than the LEED Registration result may be that real estate professionals work out of surrounding communities (as we discuss in detail below).
The next three columns in Table 3 focus on cities that share a border with a Green Policy adopter, and report results of the matched Green Neighbors and their controls. We examine the policy impact on neighboring cities for three reasons. First, the neighboring city sample may address lingering concerns about omitted variables (e.g., tastes for greenness) that could influence both policy adoption and LEED diffusion. Second, the neighbors provide a larger and more representative sample of "treated" cities. Finally, the presence or absence of neighboring city effects is informative about the underlying mechanisms that link public green procurement policies to private adoption of LEED. In particular, if the effect of Green Policy adoption in adopting cities in mainly driven by unobserved (to the analyst) regulatory or zoning preferences for LEED projects, we would expect much smaller effects in adjacent neighbor cities that do not adopt a policy.
Registrations among neighbors relative to the matched controls. This translates into a marginal effect of 72 percent when normalized by the baseline registration rate of 1.11 buildings per year. This is quite close to the 84 percent marginal effect for Green Policy adopters based on our estimates in the first column. 22 Again, these results are robust to specification, and grow larger as we relax the matching criteria. The very similar marginal effects (of policy-creating cities and the neighboring cities) indicates that effects of the procurement policies do not stop at the city line. From these findings, we conclude that link between green building procurement policies and the private sector adoption of green buildings are not solely due to preferential treatment of green buildings by city-level zoning or permitting officials. Instead, our results imply that these procurement policies are more likely to be reducing marginal costs of green building, and the green building infrastructure that emerges (e.g., architects' and builders' increasing expertise in green building practices) benefits not only the policy-adopting city but also spills over to neighboring cities. This interpretation of the neighbor-city effects is also consistent with our finding (in column five) that there are positive Government Registration effects in neighboring cities that do not themselves adopt a green-building procurement policy, but who might respond to the emergence of a green-building infrastructure based on the LEED measurement system.
Finally, the rightmost column in Table 3 presents weighted OLS estimates of the impact of a Green Neighbor on LEED Accreditations. We find a statistically significant increase of 3.9 LEED APs, or roughly 74 percent. As noted above, if the market for architects and contractors is regional, these results may explain the weaker impact of policy adoption on LEED Accreditations in the policy-adopting cities.
B. Policy Adoption Hazards
22 We also get similar estimates from unreported Poisson regressions, where the hazard ratio for Green Policy (column one) is 1.80, or an 80 percent marginal effect, and the hazard ratio for Green Neighbor (column four) is 1.67, or a 67 percent marginal effect.
One concern with a causal interpretation of the results in Table 3 is the potential for reverse causality: an active community of LEED APs, or a growing stock of LEED registered buildings, may promote the adoption of green-building procurement policies.
We address this concern by running logit models of the hazard of policy adoption. If policy adoption is driving the differences reported in Table 3 , we should find no correlation between the installed base of LEED APs or registered buildings and the adoption of a Green Policy. Table 4 reports estimates from the following specification:
where Y it is either LEED Registrations or LEED Accreditations, " t is a full set of calendaryear dummies and X i is a vector of city-level controls. We estimate this model on the sample of adopters and matched controls, keeping city-year observations for Green Policy adopters during or prior to the year of the policy change, and defining a new dependent variable that equals one in the year the city adopts the green procurement policy.
The first two columns in Table 4 show results from a CEM-weighted logit model comparing policy adopters to their matched control cities. We find no evidence that of a large surge in LEED APs or registrations prior to Green Policy adoption. In fact, the only measure that is positively associated with policy adoption is an annual measure of construction activity. These results lend support to a causal interpretation of the estimates in Table 3 , as opposed to stories of reverse causation (private LEED adoption sways public-policy makers) or regulatory capture (LEED APs lobby for a self-serving building code).
The third and fourth columns in Table 4 focus on cities that adopt a green-building procurement policy. For these cities, we find evidence that larger cities with a stronger taste for the environment (as measured by Prius 2008) adopt a green-building policy sooner. However, we find no correlations between the installed base of LEED buildings or LEED APs and the timing of policy adoption. The effects of Population and Prius2008 in these regressions are interesting in its own right. In particular, given the evidence of spillover effects in Table 3 , the hazard results suggest that promoters of green certification outside California could usefully focus on municipal governments in large "green" cities as a key constituency.
C. Panel Models
While our CEM matching strategy is fundamentally cross-sectional, we can nevertheless exploit the panel nature of the policy-adoption and outcome measures to estimate models that compare LEED diffusion in treatment and control cities, before versus after the adoption of a green-procurement policy. The results of this approach are presented in Table 5 and Figure 4 .
The first panel in Table 5 (Part A) presents results from a serried of pooled cross sectional OLS regressions, using the following specification
We interpret " 1 as a selection effect that captures the average pre-treatment difference in outcomes between treatment and control cities, while " 2 is a marginal effect that reflects average difference after the green-building policy is adopted. In Table 5 , we see that for all three outcome variables and both matched samples our estimates of " 1 are small and statistically indistinguishable from zero, while estimates of " 2 are large, positive and statistically significant. Overall, these results are consistent with patterns observed in Figure 3 , where there is little difference between treatment and control cities in the early years of our sample because adoption rates were quite low, but LEED adoption accelerated more quickly for treated cities in the second half of our sample. The bottom panel in Table 5 (Part B) introduces a city fixed-effect, which absorbs both GreenPolicyEver i and all time-invariant city-level covariates X i . However, this produces little or no change in our estimates of the marginal effect " 2 based on the pooled crosssectional specification of equation (3).
Our last set of panel models relax the functional-form assumption that treatment leads to a one-time boost in the rate of LEED registration or accreditation. Specifically, we estimate the following flexibly parameterized model:
where Y it is the number of new LEED Registrations for non-municipal commercial buildings in city i in year t; ! i is a complete set of city-specific intercepts; % t is a complete set of year dummies to capture secular trends in LEED diffusion; and X it are a set of exogenous time-varying controls (in our case, New Buildings, extrapolated to fill missing years in 2001, 2002 and 2008) . We are interested in the " y coefficients, which measure the change in LEED Registrations for policy-adopters (or adjacent neighbors) at y years from the adoption date. Since a complete set of " y would be co-linear with city-specific intercepts for treated municipalities, we normalize the treatment and control cities to have identical fitted values (up to the fixed-effects) one-year before the policy is adopted by omitting " -1 . The CEM weights are retained in estimation.
We present the results of estimating (4) Figure   4 is that treated cities gradually diverge from controls, rather than experiencing a sudden jump in LEED adoption following the policy change.
D. Instrumental Variables
Thus far, we have provided evidence that green-policy adoption is correlated with an increase both LEED registered buildings and LEED APs. This is consistent with the explanation that green-building procurement policies can break a deadlock among building professionals, who are reluctant to become APs without evidence of demand, and real-estate developers, who are reluctant to register for LEED unless there are professionals available. However, simply examining the reduced-form correlation between policy adoption, Registrations and APs obscures the underlying two-way causal links between APs and Registrations that are the basis of this explanation. This section proposes a set of instrumental variables that can isolate these relationships.
To estimate causal impact of LEED APs on LEED Registrations we need a variable that is correlated with the supply of APs and uncorrelated with unobserved factors linked to registrations. We propose to use green-policy adoption in "distant cities" as our instrument. Specifically, we instrument for the number of APs in all cities within 25 miles of a focal city using the number of Green Policies adopted by cities located between 25 and 50 miles away from the center of the focal city.
This instrument is motivated by the idea that markets for the services of real-estate professionals may be more diffuse than green tastes or policy impacts. Figure 5 provides some evidence on the spatial distribution of this market in the form of a histogram of the distance between architects and general contractors and the projects they work on, based on our McGraw Hill project level construction starts data. While both contractors and architects tend to work on projects close to their office address, the median project distance is 28 miles, and the 75 th percentile of the project-distance distribution is roughly 75 miles. Thus, we might expect local professionals to respond to distant green building policies that have no direct impact on the decisions of real-estate developers, other than through the supply of LEED APs.
To isolate the impact of LEED Registrations on APs, we require a variable that is correlated with the number of LEED projects, but uncorrelated with unobserved drivers of local real-estate professionals' decisions to seek accreditation. Building on the ideas in Corts (2010) , we propose using New Buildings as an instrument for LEED Registrations.
The underlying idea is that as the number of buildings increases, so does the probability of having one or more LEED projects that could stimulate the local LEED AP accreditation rate. Since the number of new buildings is clearly exogenous to the decision to seek LEED accreditation, our main concern with this approach is the level of real estate activity may be correlated with other factors (e.g. city size or tastes for the environment) that enter the Accreditations decision. However, since our estimates are conditional on Population and
Prius 2008, the key assumption is that variation in the intensity of development between 2003 and 2007 increases the rate of LEED Registration (e.g. because of competition among developers) without otherwise altering the incentive to seek LEED accreditation. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 use the estimation strategy described above, where we instrument for neighboring city with distant green policy adoption. In column 3, we see that the correlation between LEED APs within 25 miles of a focal city and LEED Registrations, is somewhat larger than the neighbor city correlation reported in column 1. This is consistent with our idea of a diffuse market for real-estate services. Column 4 presents our IV estimates, which show a strong first-stage correlation between distant green policies and nearby LEED Accreditations, and a strong positive impact of nearby APs on LEED Registrations.
The last two columns in Table 6 examine the causal impact of LEED Registrations on LEED Accreditations using New Buildings as an instrument for Registrations. Once again, we find a strong first-stage relationship, and a positive impact of LEED building rates on the supply of APs. As with the earlier sets of IV results, we cannot reject the hypothesis that a simple OLS regression would provide unbiased estimates of the underlying structural parameters.
The goal of our instrumental variables analyses was to provide further support for the hypothesis that green-building procurement policies can stimulate private demand for green building by helping local markets over come "excess inertia" that occurs when neither developers nor local real-estate professionals wish to make the first investment in a new standard. We found evidence of a positive causal relationship between the supply of LEED APs and the rate of LEED Registration, and similarly in the other direction. This is a necessary condition for the existence of a "chicken and egg" dilemma in new standards adoption. Moreover, the results showing how distant green procurement policies can influence local LEED Registration rates through the supply of nearby APs point to the importance of supply-side spillovers in the diffusion of LEED.
E. Coordination vs. capacity-Building
Though we have focused on the idea that government procurement policies that incorpoate LEED can foster coordination between private developers and LEED APs, an alternative story that involves no underlying coordination problem is that government adoption simply provides sufficient demand that real-estate professionals can cover the fixed costs of accreditation. This explanation suggests that the marginal effect of a municipal procurement policy should be declining in city-size, since private demand for LEED will be more likely to cover these fixed costs in larger markets. Thus, the first four columns in Table 7 interact two measure of market size (Population and New Buildings) with the Green Policy and Green Neighbor treatment dummies in an OLS regression with the number of LEED APs as the outcome. All four models suggest that the impact of policy adoption on professional accreditation is actually increasing with city-size. This is consistent with our coordination story, or demand-side explanations that emphasize awareness or learning, but not the fixed-cost capacity-building explanation.
In the last two columns of Table 7 , we use our distant policy adoption instruments to examine how the impact of APs on LEED Registrations varies with city-size. Once again, our results suggest that the marginal effect of an increase in LEED APs is increasing in market size, which is inconsistent with a story where the main effect of government green procurement is to help early APs cover their fixed costs. Overall, we take the results in Table 7 as evidence in support of the idea that government green building procurement policies help jump-start both the demand for and supply-of specialized inputs (i.e. LEED APs) to the green-building industry.
F. Limitations
In considering the generalizability of our results, it is important to consider two factors.
First, we find that government procurement rules stimulated a market, construction services, where governments are an especially large purchaser. Further research is required to examine the extent to which such rules exhibit similar effects in other markets where governments represent a smaller share of demand. Second, since LEED was just emerging as the de facto standard for green-building certification during our sample period, the marginal private adopter is likely to have high marginal benefits (or low costs) of going green once verification becomes possible. Thus, we would expect to find similar market-stimulating effects of government procurement of other goods and services in contexts where common standards have yet to emerge.
Conclusions
This paper provides evidence that public procurement policies can influence private sector purchasing decisions in a way that reinforces underlying policy goals. Given the relative scale of public and private purchasing, this may be a necessary condition for public procurement guidelines to have substantive impacts (e.g., on the scale of regulatory policy).
While there is a substantial economic literature asking whether public investments "crowd out" private spending (e.g. Goolsbee (2000) on government R&D, or Hoxby (1996) on public and private education), we find few studies of government spending "crowding in" private investment by, for example, acting as a focal adopter that "tips" the market towards a particular standard or certification scheme. Yet that is often a goal of socially motivated procurement policies, such as "buy green" initiatives.
This paper looks for evidence of "crowding in" using data on private-sector diffusion of the LEED green-building certification program following the adoption of municipal bylaws that require public construction to follow green building practices (i.e. greenbuilding procurement policies). This is admittedly a case where one might expect such reinforcing spillover effects, since LEED was rapidly emerging as the de facto standard for green building certification, and many private developers could reasonably expect that "green building" would yield direct economic benefits in the form of energy savings and increased demand. Nevertheless, we find that cities with a municipal green-building policy have roughly 80 percent more LEED registrations by 2008, compared to a matched control sample that has similar size, demographics and tastes for environmentalism (as proxied by voting behavior and Toyota Prius ownership).
Our analysis is subject to several caveats. First, Despite our efforts to construct a wellmatched control sample using the new methods developed by Iacus et al (2009) , there is clearly room a concern that our estimates are biased upwards because of an omitted taste for greenness that is correlated with both municipal procurement policies and private LEED adoption. However, we are somewhat comforted by finding similar "crowding in" effects in a sample of neighboring cities that do not themselves adopt a green-building policy. We also check and find no evidence of a divergence in LEED adoption between ""treated" cities (either policy adopters or adjacent neighbors) and their matched controls prior to the change in procurement policy. These findings provide evidence against stories of reverse causation or policy adoption by municipalities that are "captured" by greener elements of the real estate profession. Our preferred explanation for the papers main results is that green procurement policies produced a combination of moral suasion, increased awareness and fostered the development of complementary markets for specialized inputs (i.e. LEED APs).
As second caveat for this study is that we do not measure the environmental impacts of increased LEED adoption (or even the final certification of all registered buildings).
Engineering studies suggest that LEED certification is correlated with increased energy efficiency. However, those estimates are based on data from a self-selected sample of LEED certified buildings. We hope to extend this research by examining the impact of public green-building policies on certification levels and perhaps environmental impacts.
Finally, since our findings suggest that government procurement policies can catalyze the adoption of a privately developed certification scheme, one might ask whether governments typically choose "the right" standard? In the case of LEED, it is not clear whether municipal green-building policies promoted lock-in to a particular standard (the leading alternative was the EPA's Energy Star label), or increasing returns simply led private and public actors to coalesce around the most popular measurement system at the time. Nevertheless, our LEED Accreditation results show that government purchasing policies can promote standard-specific investments by various third parties (e.g. architects,
contractors and suppliers of green building materials). This both points to procurement policies as an effective policy tool, and highlights the potential dangers of lock-in to a government-selected standard (particularly if it was developed by firms hoping to preempt more stringent regulation). The question of how government should be involved in the ex ante development of voluntary standards that might later provide the basis for procurement policies is an intriguing topic for future research. 
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